University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions

The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection

2-28-1950

Cordoniz v. Cordoniz
Roger J. Traynor

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
Recommended Citation
34 Cal.2d 811

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.

Cal.

215 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

would probably have ,been no disagreement
'in the IntersMe Oil case had the challenged tax heen imposed on the privilege
-of engaging in the local activities in aid
·of the interstate transportation of oil rather
than on the privilege of engaging in the
"very process" of that transportation. The
·dissenting justices made it clear at the outset that the tax was not "for the privilege
·of operating pumping machinery or other
·equipment as incidents apart from the flow
-of the interstate commerce, Cf. Coverdale
Y. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Ca., 303
U.S. 604, 58 S.Ct. 736, 82 L.Ed. 1043."
·69 s.n. 1264, 1268. When a tax is im:posed on the privilege of conducting a 10-cal activity separable from the very processes of interstate commerce, "it is idle
to' suggest that the tax is on 'the privilege
,of engaging in interstate -business/" Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80,
~5, 68 S.Ct. 1475, 1477; Central Greyhound
Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653, 661,
·68 s.n. 1260. A state may properly impose a tax on the privilege of carrying on
.a local activity, and the fact that the activity is essential to interstate commerce
·does not uprevent a State from giving [it]
·detached relevance for purposes of local
taxation." Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S.
.249,255,67 s.n. 274, 278; Western Live
Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250,
.257, 58 S.Ct. 546; McGoldrick v. BerwindWhite Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 47, 60
·S.Ct. 388; Barker Bros., Inc. v. City of Los
Angeles, 10 Ca1.2d 603, 609, 76 P.2d 97. It is
undisputed that plaintiffs' activities are can·ducted whol1y within the jurisdiction of
the taxing authority and that plaintiffs are
required to pay on1y their share of the
,cost of· the local government who.se protec·tion they enjoy. For ,the privilege of carrying on those activities, the city of Los
Angeles can constitutionally impose the
-challenged tax.

, The' judgments are reversed.

84 Ca1.2d 811
CODORNIZ v. CODORNIZ.

Sac. 5935.
Supreme Court of CalifornIa, in Bank.
Feb. 28, 1950.
Rehearing Denied March 27, 1950.
DIvorce action by Allce D. Codornlz against
Joseph M. Codorniz. Plaintiff was granted
a divorce on ground of extreme cruelty, and
thereafter defendant applied for modIfication of the final decree by eliminating provisions of the support of plaintiff and a marrIed daughter.
.
TIle Sllperior Court for C-olusa County,
Ben R. Ragain, J., rendered an order modie
fying the decree, and plaintiff appealed.
Tbe Supreme Court, Schauer, J., held that
the trial court was warranted in finding that
the previous decree provided alimony and
child support rather than a property settlee
ment and hence was subject to modification.
The Court also held that the husband was
relieved of his obligation to pay alimony
upon remarriage of the wife, and was not
under obligation to support children upon
their emancipation .
Traynor, J., dissented.
Prior opinion, see 202 P.2d 861.

I. DIVorce ~245(1)
Provision for payment of alimony to
wife in a divorce decree granted to wife for
offense of husband may be modified by the
court under appropriate circumstances, although a decree adjusting property rights
of the parties is not subject to modification
regardless of whether it is based upon
agreement of the parties.

2. Divorce ~245(1), 309
In proceeding to modify divorce decree,
trial court has jurisdiction to determine
whether decree was based upon a property
settlement agreement with payments provided as a phase of property adjustment
and therefore· not subject to modification,
or was based upon alimony or support allowance covenants and therefore subject
to modification.

GIBSON, C. J., and SHENK, ED- 3. DIVorce ~286, 312.6(8)
CARTER, SCHAUER, and
A divorce court's findings that payments ordered under a previous decree were
:SPENCE, J]., concur.

:~IONDS,
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not based upon a property settlement agreement but were meant wholly or partially as
:alimony and child support and were therefore subject to modification, when based
upon ample evidence, are binding upon an
appellate court.
4. Divorce <'l=>245(3), 309
In divorce action, evidence justified a
finding that payments ordered in divorce
-decree were intended as alimony and child
support rather than as a property settlement and consequently were subject to
modification upon showing of changed circumstances of the parties.
.5. Divorce

~252

Where court granted wife a divorce
()n ground of extreme cruelty, and divided
equally all community property except an
equity in an undivided one-third interest
in a dairy business which court determined
was practically valueless, and court award~
ed it to husband to enable him to earn
money with which to pay alimony and support money for children, wife could not
assert a right to the dairy bu'siness on
ground that she was entitled to more than
half the community property. Civ.Code,
§§ 146, 148.
(). Divorce

~247

On remarriage of wife, divorced ht1s~
band is relieved of obligation to pay a1i~
mony. Civ.Code, § 139.
7. Divorce ¢;>310

Obligation of divorced husband to sup~
port children of the marriage ceases upon
their emancipation or reaching majority.
Civ.Code, § 206.
8. Appeal and error <'l=>1058(2)
Where wife was subsequently permit"
ted to give testimony on certain phase of
case, any error in earlier ruling of court
denying her permission to testify as to such
phase was not prejudicial.

Brown, Ford & Cooney, Colusa, for ap~
pellant.
Rutledge & Rutledge and Ralph W. Rut'ledge, Colusa, for respondent.
215 P.2d-3

SCHAUER, Justice.
Plaintiff appeals from an order made by
the trial court upon application of defendant, reducing the monthly :payments or~
dered to be paid by defendant to plaintiff
under the terms of an interlocutory and a
final decree of divorce. Plaintiff contends
that the payments were ordered as "a part
of the division of the community property
by the Court," and ,hence were not subject
to modification. We have conCluded that
the trial court was justified in determining
that such payments were in the nature of
alimony and child support and could and
should be reduced, and that the order appealed from must be affirmed:
In May, 1944, plaintiff sued defendant
for divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty. She" alleged, among other things, that
she was then earning $65 a month and in
addition was receiving $140 a month from
defendant for her support and that of the
three minor children of the parties, and
that as community property the parties were
possessed of a one-third interest in a dairy
business having a value of approximately
$30,000. Plaintiff prayed for a decree of
divorce, for custody of the three children,
that defendant be ordered to pay her attorney's fees and court costs, that he also
"be ordered to pay the sum of $75.00 a
month to plaintiff as alimony, and the sum
of $105.00 a month for the support and
maintenance of said minor children," and
for other "fit and proper" orders. In his
answer defendant denied "that the parties
are possessed of a one-third interest in the
dairy * * * and * * * alleges that
he -is buying said interest on installment
payments, most of which are yet unpaid."
In June, 1944, plaintiff was granted an
interlocutory decree of divorce on- the
ground of cruelty, and was also awarded
custody of the three children. The testimony was not reported, and findings were
waived. In June, 1945, the final decree
was entered. Each of the decrees con~'
tains a provision adjudging "That' the community property of the parties hereto con~
sisting of an equity in an undivided one~
third ('Is) interest in and to • • • a
dairy business [and the land upon which
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such business is operated 1] • • • be
awarded to the Defendant, subject, how~
ever, to the following charges, restrictions
and conditions:
"1. Defendant herein shall pay to Plaintiff herein the sum of One Hundred Forty
Dollars ($140.00) per month, as and for
the support and maintenance of Plaintiff
and the minor children of the parties here~
to, on the filst day of each and every calendar month.
"2. Defendant herein shall furnish
Plaintiff and the minor children of the
parties hereto, until further order of the
Court, milk and cream at Defendant's sole
cost and expense."
Defendant paid the $140 a month to
plaintiff through August, 1946. He then
learned that plaintiff had remarried in July,
1946, and he reduced the payments to $70
a month for September and October, 1946In the latter month the oldest of the three
children, a daughter, also married, and defendant thereafter. paid only $50 a month.
In November, 1947, plaintiff sought a contempt order against defendant by reason
.of the reduced payments, and defendant
on the ground of changed circumstances
applied to the court for a modification of
the final decree by eliminating therefrom
provisions for the support of plaintiff and
of the married daughter. A consolidated
hearing on the two matters was held before
the same judge who had rendered the divorce decrees. At the hearing the court,
over plaintiff's objection that the court was
without jurisdiction to change the property and support provisions of the final
decree, heard evidence concerning those
issues and rendered its order modifying
the divorce decrees by relieving the defendant from payments for plaintiffs support as of the date she remarried, reducing the support payments for the three
children to the sum of $105 a month to the
date of the marriage of the elder daughter
'(October 15, 1945) and to the sum of $70
a month thereafter, and releasing defendant's one-third interest in the dairy property (including the land) from "all of the
charges, restrictions and conditions" im-

posed thereon by the interlocutory and final
decrees of divorce. This appeal by plaintiff followed.

[1] As declared in Puckett v. Puckett
(1943), 21 Cal.2d 833, 840, 136 P.2d 1, 5,
a provision for the payment of alimony
to the wife in a divorce decree, granted to
the wife for the offense of the husband,
may be modified by the court under appropriate circumstances. Civ.Code, sec. 139.
* * * A divorc,e decree adjusting the
property rights of the parties is not subject to modification regardless of whether
or not it is based upon the agreement of
the parties." (See also Leupe v. Leupe
(1942), 21 Cal.2d 145, 148, 130 P.2d 697;
Adams v. Adams (1947), 29 Cal.2d 621,
625, 177 P.2d 265; Dupont v. Dupont
(1935), 4 Cal.2d 227, 228, 48 P.2d 677;
Ettlinger v. Ettlinger (1935), 3 Cal.2d 172,
178, 44 P.2d 540; Fields v. Fields (1949),
94 Cal.App.2d 56, 209 P.2d 977.
U

[2,3] It has also been held that in modification proceedings the trial court has
jurisdiction to determine whether the de..
cree was based upon a property settlement
agreement with payments provided as a
phase of property adjustment and therefore
not subject to modification or was based
upon alimony or support allowance covenants and therefore subject to modification.
(See Hough v. Hough (1945), 26 Cal.2d
605,615, 160 P.2d 15, and cases there cited;
Alexander v. Alexander (1948), 88 Cal.
App.2d 724, 727, 199 P.2d 348. In the
Hough case t1Iis court pointed out that
HIn various cases it has been assumed that
the court may pass upon that issue or
similar issues in such proceedings." [26
Cal.2d 605, 160 P.2d 20.] In the same
case we quoted with approval the following statement from Wallace v. Wallac;e
(1934), 136 Ca1.App. 488, 493, 29 P.2d 314,
made on appeal from an order denying a
motion for modification: UFurthermore,
this agreement was before the court upon
the order for modification, and upon that
hearing the court made the findings given
above I to the effect t'hat the payments directed to be made were not in the nature
of alimony but 'was the balance of the

I. The clause including the land appears in the final decree only.
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sums due plaintiff under said contract of
property settlement. That being a definite
finding upon the issue before the court,
we are bound thereby. As the court said
in Atlass v. Allass [1931], 112 Cal.App.
514, 297 P. 53, 54: 'Had the court found
the provisions for support to have been
in fact by way of property settlement then
the said provisions could not have been
disturbed * * *' ' There was ample evidence to support the finding in the instant
case, and we must therefore accept the
same as true." (See also Weedon v. Weedon (1949), 92 Cal.App.2d 367, 369, 207 P.
2d 78; Fields v. Fields (1949) supra, 94
Cal.App.2d 56, 209 P.2d 977. It follows
from the rules just stated that the trial court
likewise has jurisdiction, in a proceeding
such as this, to determine whether payments
ordered under a decree concededly not
based (at least not directly or wholly)
upon a property settlement agreemen~ were
intended to be in lieu of property rights
and not subject to modification, or were
meant wholly or partially as alimony and
child support provisions and were therefore
subject to modification, and that that court's
findings based upon ~jample evidence to
support" such findings are likewise binding
upon an appellate court.
At the hearing on the modification application here, the trial judge declared it
to be his Udefinite recollection that the
tcstimony [at the divorce trial] showed
that at that time the community interest
in the contract of purchase of the dairy
l)Usiness * * * was very, very slight
* * * [T]he Court remembers very distinctly that (-he defendant testified * • •
that as far as he was concerned he was
willing-and did consider the equity of the
community in the contract as being of practically no value-and he made the offer in
court that he'd be very willing to step down
and Qut and forget about it, and if she
wanted the interest in the dairy property
she could have it. ... * * He was willing to turn ,it over to her if she wanted it."
T'he judge further stated that "the Court,
in keeping with that proof introduced at
the trial of this case, made a ruling awarding all of the interest in the community
property to the defendant so as to enable

him to properly comply with the coures
order for the support of the children and
of the widow. * * * The testimony at
the time was that the community value in
the eontract of the purchase * • • was
practically valueless, and that was the rcason the Court made the order. The proof
was very very definite on that; there is no
question about that,"
[4] Both plaintiff and defendant testified at the modification 'hearing that at the
time of the divorce Haround $3,000" had
been paid toward purchase of the interest
in the dairy. Defendant further stated
that the full purchase price of the onethird share was $7,500, Hnot a cent down.
I was paying it so much a month," and that
his average income from operation of the
dairy, to which he devoted his own services, was $267 monthly. Concerning testimony by plaintiff that the valuation of such
share Hwas said to be $10,000.00," the court
stated, lIif there had been any testimony
at the time of the 'interlocutory decree that
there was a community interest in that
property of $10,000.00, the Court certainly
would not have made an order awarding
all of the community property to the defendant; because that was not the testimony." At the modification hearing the
parties testified further that certain other
community property had been divided between them outside of the. divorce suit:
plaintiff had received furniture and a savings account and defendant received an
automobile. In addition to the evidence
summarized above is the fact that in her
complaint for divorce plaintiff asked for
the payment of monthly alimony and support for the children, and did not seek any
interest in the community property. With
the recited facts in mind it is apparent
that the trial court was warranted in its
holding that the payments ordered in the
divorce decrees were intended as alimony
and child support, and were consequently
subject to modification upon the showing
of the changed circumstances of the parties.
[5] Plaintiff relies upon the rule stated
in Treece v. Treece (1932), 125 Cal.App.
726, 728, 14 P.2d 95, that "Judgments are
to have a reasonable intendment [citation],
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and where it admits of two constructions
t!hat one will be adopted which is consonant with the judgment which should
have been rendered on the facts and law
of the case [citation]," and urges that inasmuch as the divorce was granted to her
upon the ground of extreme cruelty she
was entitled to more than half the ,community property and therefore the divorce
decrees, under which the dairy interest
was awarded to defendant subject to the
payments ordered ·to be made to plaintiff,
must be construed as an adjustment of the
property rights of the parties. Although
it was held in Tipton v. Tipton (1930), 209
Cal.443, 444, 288 P. 65, 66, that "the plain
inference to be derived" from the code
sections (Civ.Code, §§ 146, 148) having to
do with the assignment of community property by the court "is t'hat when the divorce
is granted on' the ground of extreme cruel~
ty the. n~moffending party is entitled to
more than that awarded to one who is at
fault," that holding was announced on
appeal from an interlocutory decree grant~
ed on the ground of extreme ,cruelty, in
which "all of the community property,
consisting of real estate of the value of
:$2,500 and an automobile" was awarded
to defendant husband. By contrast, the
community property involved in the in~
stant divorce suit (being only the equity in
the undividesl one-third interest in the
dairy business and land, all other com~
munity _property having been previously di~
vided otherwise than by court order in
this divorce action) was stated by the court
to be' "practically valueless" and to have
been awarded to defendant to enable him
to earn through his own services the money
with which to pay the alinwny and support
money for the children, which was sought
by plaintiff in her complaint for divorce.
Since we do not have here an appeal from
the basic' judgment in the divorce suit, and
have no means of knowing what evidence
was before the court at the trial of that
action, we have no legitimate basis for
assuming that the court erred in such basic
decision;- or that on the motion its con~
struction of its own judgment was inaccurate~ Indeed, such evidence as is dis~
closed suggests t1tat the trial court was

quite right in concluding that the dairy
equity was "practically valueless"; defendant, by devoting his services to the dairy,
was able to draw from it only $267 month.
ly. Obviously, the rule of the Tipton case
is not controlling on this appeal.
(6,7] It is, of course, established that
upon the remarriage of the wife_ the hus·
band is relieved of the obligation to pay
alimony to her (Civ.Code, § 139; see Hale
v. Hale (1935), 6 Cal.App.2d 661, 663, 4.>
P.2d 246), and that l1is obligation to support children of the marriage (other than
under the conditions contemplated by sec~
tion 206 of the Civil Code, not· involved
here) ceases upon their emancipation or
reaching majority (Hale v. Hale (1935),
supra; Meek v. Meek (1942), 51 Cal.App.
2d 492, 125 P.2d 117; Putnam v. Putnam
(1942), 51 Cal.App.2d 696, 699, 125 P.2d
525; see also Hough v. Hough (1945),
supta, 26 Ca1.2d 605. 608, 160 P.2d 15. In
both the Meek and the Putnam cases it
was held that in modification proceedings
the trial court could, and in t'he Putnam
case correctly did, interpret an agreement
between the parties for payment by the
husband of money for child support, as
terminating when the children reached
majority.
(8] Plaintiff also complains of refusal'
by the court at one stage in the modification proceedings to permit her to testify as
to whether she received 'li any of the com·
munity property outside of" the divorce de·
cree. However, as appears hereinabove,.
she was later allowed to give her testimony
on th~s phase of the case, and consequently
any error in the earlier ruling of the court
was not prejudicial to her.
For the reasons stated hereinabove, the
order appealed from is affirmed.
GIBSON, C. J.. and SHENK,. ED·
MONDS, CARTER, and SPENCE, JJ.,
concur.
TRAYNOR, Justice.
I dissent.
In my opinion the order affirmed hereiu
deprives plaintiff of the share of the com·
munity property to which she is entitled uhder section 146 of the Civil Code.

-----
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When the divorce decree awards some
property to each party and also provides for
monthly payments, without specifying
whether they are part of a property settlement or alimony, it may be difficult to determine what they are. Sec Puckett v.
Puckett, 21 Cal.2d 833, 841, 136 P.2d 1;
Hough v. Hough, 26 Cal.2d 605, 615, 160
P.2d 15; Adams v. Adams, 29 Cal.2d 621,
625, 177 P.2d 265. When, as in this case,
however, the court awards all the community property to the husband, the monthly payments clearly constitute part of a
settlement of property rights.
It is undisputed that when the inter~
locutory decree of divorce was entered approximately $3,000 had been paid for the
community interest in the dairy. Plaintiff
was granted a divorce on the ground of
extreme cruelty and was therefore entitled
to at least half the community property.
(Civ.Code, § 146.) The court awarded all
the community property to defendant and
ordered him to pay plaintiff $140 per month
for the support and maintenance of herself
and the three minor children. These pay~
ments were made a charge against the community property awarded to defendant.
Since Civil Code section 146 guarantees
plaintiff at least half the community property, the decree ordering payments to her
must be· interpreted as a decree adjusting
the property rights of the parties to protect
her interest in the community property.
The holding that the payments were alimany and subject to modification is in
fact a holding that the trial court entered
a decree it could not validly enter. It is
settled that if a judgment is susceptible
of two interpretations, aBe of which would
make it invalid and the other valid, it must
be given the interpretation that renders it
valid. Treece v. Treece, 125 Ca1.App. 726,
728, 14 P.2d 95; Watson v. Lawson, 166
Cal. 235, 242, 135 P. 961; Webster v. Webster, 216 Cal. 485, 488, 14 P.2d 522; Hogarty v. Hogarty, 188 Cal. 625, 627, 206 P.
79.
In Tipton v. Tipton, 209 Cal. 443, 288 P.
65, a decree awatding the defendant all
the community property, consisting of real
eState worth $2,500 and an automobile, was
reversed on the ground that Civil Code

section 146 guarantees the plaintiff at least
half the community property when the divorce is granted on the ground of extreme
cruelty. The majority opinion attempts to
distinguish the Tipton case on the ground
that the trial judge considered the $3,000
equity in the dairy business to be "practically valueless." A $3,000 equity in a dairy
business worth $30,000 is not "practically
valueless."
At the very least, the equity in the dairy
had the value of a right to complete the
purchase of the one-third interest. What~
ever the court thought of the value of the
property, there can be no doubt that had
there been no award of monthly payments
plaintiff would have been deprived of her
share thereof. She is just as much deprived of that share when the court terminates the payments on the ground that
they were alimony.
Community property is often a going
business managed by the husband. It may
then be to the best interests of both parties
to avoid liquidation of the business by
awarding the wife her share ·of the property in the form of monthly payments.
Such a division will be equitable, however,
only if those payments are treated, not'as
alimony, but as part of a property settlement not subject to modification. If, for
example, the community property is worth
$200,000 and the decree provides that the
husband receive all of it and that the wife
on the basis of her life expectancy receive
$500 per month, and one year after her
divorce the wife remarries, it would be
manifestly inequitable to hold that the payments were alimony and therefore terminated, for she would then receive only
$6,000 in lieu of community property worth
at least $100,000. The inequity is just as
real if the amount involved is small.
There can be no stability to such property settlements if the court, as in this case,
uses defendant's earnings some three years
after the decree was enterd as a basis for
a determination that all the community
property was properly awarded to him.
A business of great value may still not
make a profit. It may be profitable at the
time a divorce decree is entered but unprofitable thereafter. When the husband
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agrees to make monthly payments in lieu
In any event, the award cannot be made
of liquidating the business, he assumes the to appear excessive unless the dual func-

risk that it may not be so profitable or of tion of the monthly payments is disregardsuch value as he supposed. If the trial ed. The decree provided, not only for a
court erred "in making that choice for him settlement of property rights, but for the
in the divorce decree, his remedy is by support of the minor children. The amount
appeal. "A divorce decree adjusting the to be allotted for this support was not
property rights of the parties is not sub- specified as it should have been, cf. Puckett
ject to modification regardless of whether v. Puckett, 21 Ca1.2d 833, 841, 136 P.2d
or not it is based upon the agreement of the 1; Hough v. Hough, 26 Ca1.2d 605, 615, 160
parties." Puckett v. Puckett, 21 Cal.2d 833, P.2d 15; Adams v. Adams, 29 Ca1.2d 621,
840, 136 P.2d 1, 5.
625, 177 P.2d 265, but given the division
adopted by the trial court in the modificart is clear from the record that the trial tion proceedings, it appears that only one
judge concluded that he had erred in award- fourth of the $140, or $35 per month, can
ing plaintiff monthly payments in lieu of be attributed to the wife's share of the comher share of the community property and munity property. Had the decree provided
that he sought to correct his error in the that defendant was to receive all the commodification proceedings. If he made an munity property and plaintiff was to re...
error, however, it was judicial and not ceivc $35 per month for her support and
clerical in character. "The judgment in maintenance and $105 per month for the
this case was the identical judgment which support and maintenance of the minor chilthe tri~l court intended to render. There dren, there would be no question that the
was no mistake in its entry, and it ex· provision for the payment of $35 per month
pressed in apt and definite terms the con- was part of a settlement of the property
clusion at which the trial court arrived dur- rights and therefore not subject to modifiing the trial of the action. If the court cation. Hogarty v. Hogarty, 188 Cal. 625,
misconstrued the evidence before it, or 627,206 P. 79; Webster v. Webster, 216
misapplied the law applicable to the facts Cal. 485, 488, 14 P.2d 522; Puckett v.
disclosed by the evidence, or was even Puckett, 21 Ca1.2d 833, 842, 136 P.2d 1.
misled by counsel, such an error was in
It is only when the amounts properly atno sense a clerical error which could theretributable to child support are treated as
after be corrected by the court upon its relevant to the division of the community
own motion or in any procce,ding except
property that the total award is made to
on motion for a new trial." Lankton v.
appear too large to be reasonably attribu~
Superior Court, 5 Ca1.2d 694, 696, 55 P.2d table in part to a division of the community
1170; Stevens v. Superior Court, 7 Ca1.2d property.
110, 112, 59 P.2d 988; In re Estate of
BU1'llett, 11 Ca1.2d 259, 262, 79 P.2d 89;
The payments were ordered Has and for
Bastajian v. Brown, 19 Ca1.2d 209, 214, the support and maintenance of Plaintiff
120 P.2d 9; Barlow v. City Council of City and the minor children of the parties here·
of Inglewood, 32 Ca1.2d 688, 692-693, 197 to." In view of the disparity between the
P.2d 721; see, 2 McBaine, California Trial total award and an amount appropriate
and Appellate Practice, pp. 204-214; 9 solely for a division of the community
Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed., § 2450. property, it would be unreasonable to conOnce the divorce decree became final, the clude that it was intended that the total
trial judge was powerless to .change the amount continue to be payable after the
amount awarded to plaintiff in lieu of com· p.arcntal- duty of support had terminated.
munity property, even if he concluded that Putnam v. Putnam, 51 Ca1.App.2d 696, 699,
the amount awarded was excessive. He 125 P.2d 525; Meck v. Meek, 51 Ca1.App.
cannot lawfully do so indirectly by disre- 2d 492, 495, 125 P.2d 117. Had the decree
garding the comlnunity property award and properly segregated the amounts attribuholding the monthly payments to be ali- table to child support, there would be no
pr-obkm in determining w~at reduction
"(~on~.
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should be made. When the decree is silent
on the question of allocation, however, it
has been held proper for the trial conrt to
determine the reasonable allocation in s'l1b~
sequent proceedings. Putnam v. Putnam,
supra; 1Yleek v. Meek, supra. In this case
the trial court has determined that $35
per month is the amount attributable to the
support of each child. Accordingly, the Ofder should be affirmed to the extent that
it reduces the payments attributable to the
support of the children by $35 per month
in view of the marriage of the cldest child.
The unqualified affirmance of the order,
which terminates plaintiff's right to receive $35 per month, deprives her of her
share cl the community property in viola~
tion of section 146 of the Civil Code.

defendant was agent of other or that they
were joint adventurers.
Judgment reversed.
I. Joint adventures

~1.15

Principal and agent ~3(4)'

In action to recover contract price for
certain doors allegedly sold and delivered
by plaintiffs to defendants, or in lieu of
payment, for return of doors, evidence was
insufficient to sustain judgment for p1aintiffs on theory that one defendant was
agent of other or that they were joint adventurers.
2. Appeal and error <P840(1), 1078(1)

In action for recovery of contract price
of doors, issue as to whether title to doors
passed from plaintiff to third party under
theory of cash sale, which was neither emRehearing denied; TRAYNOR, J., dis- braced by pleadings or findings nor argued,
senting.
:would not be considered on appeal.

II

o , K~a"'''"'''';:''-::'':::'':::'"''

~1:ancuso

& Herron, San Francisco, for

appellant.
Lindsay P. Marshall, Lodi, for respondents.
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GRIFFIN el a!. v. VAN WINKLE 01 al.
Civ. 7673.
Sac. 6025.

District Court of Appeal, Third District,
California.
Feb. 27, 1950.
Hearing Denied April 27, 1950.

Action by R. I..I. Griffin and l\I. E. Miller,
Individually, and doing business as R. L.
Griffin and M. E. Miller Lumber Company,

against 'V. S. Van WInkle, individunlly and

doing business as Chicago I.lumber Company,
Bobbie CoIlins, and others, to recover COlltract price for certain doors allegedly sold
and delivered by them to defendants, 01' in
lieu of payment, for return of the doors.
The Superior Court, San Joaquin County,
Thomas B. Quinn, J. t entered judgment for
plaintiffs and defendant Van Winkle appealed.
The District Court of Appeal, Peck, .T.,
held that evidence was insufficient to sustain
Judgment· for ,plaintiffs on theory that one

PEEK, Justice.
By their complaint plaintiffs sought to
recover the contract price for certain doors
allegedly sold and delivered by thcm to the
defendants, or in lieu of payment, for the
return of the doors. The cause was heard
by the court sitting without a jury, and
judgment was entered for plaintiffs. Defendant Van Winkle alone appeals.
The complaint is in three counts. The
first count alleges that on February 24,
1947, plaintiffs sold and delivered to defendants 627 doors for an alleged agreed price
of $6,136.25; that payment for the doors
was made by a check executed by Gerald lYL
Goldstein payable to defendant Collins and
endorsed in blank by Collins; that Collins
was the agent of defendant W. S. Van
\;Vinkle individually, and doing business as
Chicago Lumber Company; that when the
check was presented fo'r payment the account upon which it was drawn was closed;
and that plaintiffs' dem~nd for payment or '

